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ABSTRACT 
 
In the trolley case, an individual is faced with killing one man in order to save five equally 
innocent people. This philosophical conundrum pits deontology (do not murder) against 
utilitarianism (saving lives). Numerous non-libertarian commentators have weighed in on this 
challenge. The present paper offers a libertarian analysis of this case. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Foot (1967, 1) discusses “the driver of a runaway tram which he can only steer 
from one narrow track on to another; five men are working on one track and one 
man on the other; anyone on the track he enters is bound to be killed.” 
Another classic statement of the trolley challenge reads as follows (Thomson, 
1976, 206):  
 
David is a great transplant surgeon.  Five of his patients need new parts – one 
needs a heart, the others need, respectively, liver, stomach, spleen, and spinal 
cord – but all are of the same, relatively rare, blood-type.  By chance, David 
learns of a healthy specimen with that very blood-type.  David can take the 
healthy specimen’s parts, killing him, and install them in his patients, saving 
them.  Or he can refrain from taking the healthy specimen’s parts, letting his 
patients die. 
 
If David may not even choose to cut up one where five will thereby be saved, 
surely what people who say “Killing is worse than letting die” mean by it must be 
right! 
On the other hand, there is a lovely, nasty difficulty which confronts us at this 
point.  Philippa Foot says2 – and seems right to say- that it is permissible for 
Edward, in the following case, to kill: 
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(5) Edward is the driver of a trolley, whose brakes have just failed.  On the 
track ahead of him are five people; the banks are so steep that they will not be 
able to get off the track in time.  The track has a spur leading off to the right, 
and Edward can turn the trolley onto it.  Unfortunately there is one person on 
the right-hand track.  Edward can turn the trolley, killing the one; or he can 
refrain from turning the trolley, killing the five. 
 
If what people who say “Killing is worse than letting die” mean by it is true, 
how is it that Edward may choose to turn that trolley? 
Killing and letting die apart, in fact, it’s a lovely, nasty difficulty:  why is it 
that Edward may turn that trolley to save his five, but David may not cut up his 
healthy specimen to save his five?  I like to call this the trolley problem, in honor 
of Mrs. Foot’s example. 
The philosophers usually credited with plagueing us with this challenge are 
Foot, 1967; and Thomson, 1976, 1985. Since then there have been literally 
hundreds of discussions of this issue. But not a one of them has been written from 
a libertarian perspective. The contribution of the present paper is to offer a 
distinctively libertarian analysis of the trolley problem. 
We do well, then, to at least briefly discuss this particular political economic 
philosophy (Rothbard, 1998; Hoppe 1989, 1993; Huebert, 2010; Kinsella, 1992, 
1996). Libertarianism is not a theory of law, nor is it an analysis of rights, nor, 
yet, ethics. Rather, it is an attempt to discern what the proper law should be; an 
analysis of the just use of violence. As a first approximation, there is the non-
aggression principle (NAP). According to this axiom of libertarianism, it should be 
legal for a person to do whatever he wants to do,1 provided, only, that he refrain 
from initiating aggressive violence against anyone else and his legitimately owned 
property.  Libertarianism does not say people should adhere to the NAP; that it 
would be right for them to do so. It only maintains that if they do not so restrict 
themselvs, they are in violation of libertarian law. But that is merely a first 
approximation. At bottom, libertarianism is a theory of what constitutes just 
punishment2 for law breakers. 
                                                 
1 With his own person and justly owned property, based on homesteading (Block, 1990, 2002A, 
2002B; Block and Edelstein, 2012; Block and Yeatts, 1999-2000; Block vs Epstein, 2005; 
Bylund, 2005, 2012; Grotius, 1625; Hoppe, 1993, 2011; Kinsella, 2003, 2006; Locke, 1948; Paul, 
1987; Pufendorf, 1673; Rothbard, 1973, 32; Rozeff, 2005; Watner, 1982) and legitimate title 
transfer (Nozick, 1974) 
2 In the view of Rothbard (1998, p. 88, ft. 6): “It should be evident that our theory of 
proportional punishment—that people may be punished by losing their rights to the extent 
that they have invaded the rights of others—is frankly a retributive theory of punishment, a 
‘tooth (or two teeth) for a tooth’ theory. Retribution is in bad repute among philosophers, who 
generally dismiss the concept quickly as ‘primitive’ or ‘barbaric’ and then race on to a 
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It is only the first approximation of libertarianism to aver: do not violate 
rights. The more sophisticated version, is that libt is a theory of punishment: if 
you violate rights, we punish you in thus and such a manner. 
This is in sharp contrast to the non libertarians who have tried to wrestle with 
the trolley challenge. For example, states Thomson (1976, 204, emphasis added): 
“Alfred kills his wife out of a desire for her death. Bert lets his wife die out of a 
desire for her death. But what Bert does is surely every bit as bad as what Alfred 
does. So killing isn’t worse than letting die.” Note that this philosopher is not 
concerned with proper law, and punishment, use of violence against, criminals. 
Rather, she, like so many others (Unger, 1992, 1996; Kamm, 1989; Barcalow, 
2007; Singer, 2005; Mikhail, 2007; Norcross, 2008; Otsuka, 2008; Hauser, et al, 
2007), focuses on the good and the bad, the bad and the worse, what people should 
do and refrain from doing. It cannot be denied that of course there is a strong 
overlap between these two different concerns, but it is the divergences that 
distinguish the libertarian analysis of the trolley case from that of all others. 
One more element of libertarianism. In this view, there is no such thing as 
positive rights. There are only negative rights (Block, 1986; Gordon, 2004; Katz, 
undated; Long, 1993; Mercer, 2001; Rothbard, 1982; Selick, 2014). A right implies 
an obligation. If Smith has a (negative) right not to be murdered, raped, robbed, 
then everyone else has a negative obligation not to murder, rape or rob him. It is 
incumbent upon all others to refrain from initiating violence against him. If Smith 
has a (positive) right to food, clothing and shelter, then all other people have a 
positive obligation to give him these goods. But, if so, then their own negative 
rights to their private property will have been violated. 
We are now in a position to shed some light on the issue of killing an innocent 
person on the one hand, and letting him die on the other. Under the libertarian 
code, the former would be considered murder, and punished severely. However, 
allowing someone to die, standing idly by while another person perishes, would 
not be considered a crime. Now, it may not be nice to do so, it may not be moral 
or ethical to fail to come to the aid of a potential victim, but, qua libertarianism, 
that is not, cannot be, our concern. Rather, we focus, very narrowly, on whether 
or not an NAP violation, an uninvited (personal) border crossing has taken place, 
and, if so, what violent repercussion would be justified. 
Pinker (2011, 328) states: “Most of us agree that it is ethically permissible to 
divert a runaway trolley that threatens to kill five people onto a side track where 
it would kill only one. But suppose it were a hundred million lives one could save 
                                                                                                                                                                  
discussion of the two other major theories of punishment: deterrence and rehabilitation. But 
simply to dismiss a concept as ‘barbaric’ can hardly suffice; after all, it is possible that in this 
case, the ‘barbarians’ hit on a concept that was superior to the more modern creeds.” See also 
Block, 1999, 2002-2003, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2009A, 2009B; Block, Barnett and 
Callahan, 2005; Gregory and Block, 2007; Kinsella, 1996; Morris, 1968; Olson, 1979; Rothbard, 
1998, 88; Whitehead and Block, 2003 
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by diverting the trolley, or a billion, or ─ projecting into the indefinite future ─ 
infinitely many. How many people would it be permissible to sacrifice to attain 
that infinite good? A few million can seem like a pretty good bargain.” 
What is the libertarian analysis of someone who diverts the trolley from its 
present track where it will kill, say, a billion people, and onto a path where it will 
murder a single individual? Utilitarians would speak out as one: such an act would 
be justified, since it would save one billion minus one lives.  Most commentators 
would agree.3 
But things are different for the libertarian. The diverter of the trolley is a 
murderer. We must not lose sight of this primordial fact. As such, he must be 
punished to the full extent of the law. And what, pray tell, is the full extent of the 
law? His life is forfeit, since he took someone else’s life. However, if the heirs of 
the victim, all of them, all five billion of them, forgive this murderer his crime, 
then and only then may he go free. But if even one of these heirs wants to impose 
the death penalty of our savior of five billion lives, he has the right to insist upon 
this punishment.4 
This brings us to the libertarian concentration camp guard (Block, 2009). Here 
is the situation. All such criminals must murder 100 innocent Jews, gypsies, 
blacks, gays, other non Ayrians, per day. However, we posit that a libertarian 
guard can get away with murdering only 90 victims daily. If he goes below this 
figure, say, to a mere 89 or fewer murders, he will be found out, and himself 
summarily executed. Of course, our liberrtarian hero engages in this dangerous 
pursuit not to murder 90 people daily, but rather to save 10, who, we posit, would 
perish were it not for his admirable5 and courageous acts. A week goes by, the war 
is over, and our libertarian murderer is in the dock at the Nuremberg trial. He has 
murdered 630 people, but saved 70. Should he be put to death for his evil deeds? 
Yes, unless all of the heirs of the 630 victims agree to forgive him his tresspasses. 
Our hero may plead with these people: “I wish I could have saved your parent, 
your child, your spouse, but I could not. I could only save 10 people per day. That 
is why I embarked upon this dangerous acts of mine. If I had saved even as few as 
one more person daily, I would have been discovered, and prevented from saving 
                                                 
3 Thomson (1976, 206) states: “Edward may turn that trolley to save his five (people, at the cost 
of one life).” If so, she would certainly favor saving a billion people even though one innocent 
man must be murdered. 
4 However, some of us will hold a ticker tape parade in honor of this murderer, and pin a big 
medal on this chest before the execution. After all, he is a hero. He lives, we may suppose, in a 
libertarian society and full well knows the penalty for murder: execution. Yet, he engaged in 
this heroic murder in order to save the lives of five billion people. We cannot do this qua 
libertarian, since this very narrow philosophy admits of no such actions. But, we can do this as 
decent human beings. 
5 We say this not qua libertarian, which, we insist, is a very narrow philosophy, concerned only 
with justified punishment for criminal behavior. See Block 2001B, 2002, 2003B, 2004, 2006 
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any more victims of Nazi oppression.” Whether or not he prevails, he desserves, 
once again, a medal, a parade in his honor, and the thanks of all civilized people. 
In order to further highlight the differences on the Trolley question between a 
libertarian and members of other philosophical traditions, I offer my responses to 
a popular query on this subject 
(http://www.philosophyexperiments.com/fatman/). My responses are in italics. 
 
 
II. Should You Kill the Fat Man? Preliminary Questions 
 
This activity is a treatment of some of the issues thrown up by a thought 
experiment called ‘The Trolley Problem’, which was first outlined by the 
philosopher Philippa Foot, and then developed by Judith Jarvis Thomson and 
others. But before we start properly, we need to ask you four preliminary 
questions so we get a sense of the way that you think about morality. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Just select the option that most corresponds to your view. 
 
Question 1: Torture, as a matter of principle, is always morally wrong. 
I answered no. As a libertarian, I have no views on this. No, I go further. Qua 
libertarian, I am precluded from having an opinion on this vital issue. Because it 
asks about morality, and libertarianism, in sharp contrast, deals only with what 
the law should be. So, I can only answer as a citizen, as a moralist. I can think of 
cases where it would be justified. For example, if the criminal tortured a victim, it 
would be just, under the libertarian code, to torture him back. 
Question 2: The morality of an action is determined by whether, compared to 
the other available options, it maximises the sum total of happiness of all the 
people affected by it. 
I responded in the negative to this one, too. Not because I have strong views 
about morality; I don’t. I answered in this way because utilitarianism turns me 
off, and this sounded pretty utilitarian to me. 
 
Question 3: It is always, and everywhere, wrong to cause another person’s 
death - assuming they wish to stay alive - if this outcome is avoidable. 
This one, too, got a thumbs down from me. Again, as a libertarian, I know of 
nothing “wrong” except that which violates the NAP. But, surely, given that the 
death penalty is justified, and as a libertarian I maintain it is (Block, 2006), it 
would be justified to execute a murderer, even assuming he wished to stay alive. 
 
Question 4: If you can save the lives of innocent people without reducing the 
sum total of human happiness, and without putting your own life at risk, you are 
morally obliged to do so. 
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I responded positively to this question, since in my own vision of morality, it 
would be immoral not to save someone’s life if I could do so with trivial cost to 
myself. However, speaking as a libertarian, I would oppose laws requiring that we 
give aid to each other, as this would be a positive obligation, and libertarians 
support only negative rights. 
 
Next question: 
Should You Kill the Fat Man? - The Scenarios 
You will now be presented with four different scenarios to test your moral 
intuitions against the answers you gave to the first four questions. 
 
The Runaway Train (Scenario 1 of 4) 
The brakes of the train that Casey Jones is driving have just failed. There are 
five people on the track ahead of the train. There is no way that they can get off 
the track before the train hits them. The track has a siding leading off to the right, 
and Casey can hit a button to direct the train onto it. Unfortunately, there is one 
person stuck on the siding. Casey can turn the train, killing one person; or he can 
allow the train to continue onwards, killing five people. 
Should he turn the train (1 dead); or should he allow it to keep going (5 dead)? 
Turn the Train 
Allow the Train to Keep Going 
I do not know what Jones “should” do. I do know that if he turns the train he 
is a murderer, if he allows it to keep going he is not. Based on the analysis offered 
above, if he turns the train to save four lives, he fits the bill of “heroic murderer. I 
had to answer, otherwise I couldn’t finish the quiz, so I filled in “turn the train,” 
making him into a heroic murderer. 
I was then presented with the following: 
Interesting. you do not believe there is any general moral requirement to 
maximise the happiness of the greatest number of people, yet you think that 
Casey Jones ought to divert the train. There’s no contradiction here, but it would 
be interesting to know what thoughts motivated your decision. For now, though, 
let’s see what you make of the scenario below. 
 
The Fat Man on the Bridge (Scenario 2 of 4) 
 
Marty Bakerman is on a footbridge above the train tracks. He can see that the 
train approaching the bridge is out of control, and that it is going to hit five 
people who are stuck on the track just past the bridge. The only way to stop the 
train is to drop a heavy weight into its path. The only available heavy enough 
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weight is a (very) fat man, who is also watching the train from the footbridge. 
Marty can push the fat man onto the track into the path of the train, which will 
kill him but save the five people already on the track; or he can allow the train to 
continue on its way, which will mean that the five will die. 
Should he push the fat man onto the track (1 dead); or allow the train to 
continue (5 dead)? 
Push the fat man onto the track 
Allow the train to continue   Please make a choice! 
I voted for pushing the fat man onto the track, so as to make Bakerman, also, 
into a heroic murderer. I might as well be consistent, I thought. But, I could as 
easily have gone the other way, if I wanted to reduce the incidence of murder. 
 
Next, I was presented with the following: 
 
That’s an interesting response. Previous research has indicated that most 
people disagree with you that it would be right to push the fat man off the bridge 
into the path of the train. However, your response is certainly consistent with 
your claim that Casey Jones should divert the runaway train so that it only kills 
one person rather than five. However, as before, there is a puzzle in that you do 
not think there is any general moral requirement to maximise happiness, which 
makes the reason why you think it is justified to kill the fat man to save five 
people unclear. Perhaps your response to the scenario below will help to clarify 
your thinking here. 
 
The Saboteur (Scenario 3 of 4) 
 
Okay so this scenario is identical to the preceding scenario but with one crucial 
difference. This time Marty Bakerman knows with absolute certainty that the fat 
man on the bridge is responsible for the failure the train’s brakes: upset by train 
fare increases, he sabotaged the brakes with the intention of causing an accident. 
As before, the only way to stop the train and save the lives of the five people 
already on the track is to push the fat saboteur off the bridge into the path of the 
train. 
Should Marty push the fat saboteur onto the track (1 dead); or allow the train 
to continue (5 dead)? 
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Push the fat saboteur onto the track 
Allow the train to continue   Please make a choice! 
I elected to shove fatty onto the track; he richly deserved to die, as he was a 
murderer. And, if this could save five innocent people, that is even better.  
Whereupon, I was presented with this material: 
 
Your belief that the right thing to do is to throw the saboteur off the bridge is 
not surprising given your previous response that it would be right to throw an 
‘innocent’ (fat) man off the bridge if it had the effect of saving five people. We 
noted a tension in your earlier response in that it wasn’t clear why you thought it 
justified to kill the innocent man given that you do not think there is any general 
moral requirement to maximise happiness. However, this tension is less 
pronounced this time around, since presumably thoughts to do with culpability 
are part of the moral calculus in deciding whether it is justified to throw the 
saboteur off the bridge. It is possible that similar thoughts about culpability will 
be a part of how you think about the scenario below. 
 
The Fat Man and the Ticking Bomb (Scenario 4 of 4) 
 
The fat man, having avoided being thrown in front of the runaway train, has 
been arrested, and is now in police custody. He states that he has hidden a nuclear 
device in a major urban centre, which has been primed to explode in 24 hours 
time. The following things are true: 
1. The bomb will explode in 24 hours time. 
2. It will kill a million people if it explodes. 
3. If bomb disposal experts get to the bomb before it explodes, there’s a chance 
it could be defused. 
4. The fat man cannot be tricked into revealing the location of the bomb, nor 
is it possible to appeal to his better nature, nor is it possible to persuade him that 
he was wrong to plant the bomb in the first place. 
5. If the fat man is tortured, then it is estimated there is a 75% chance that he 
will give up the bomb’s location. 
6. If the fat man does not reveal the location, the bomb will explode, and a 
million people will die: there is no other way of finding out where the bomb is 
located. 
Should the fat man be tortured in the hope that he will reveal the location of 
the nuclear device? 
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Yes, the fat man should be tortured 
No, the fat man should not be tortured   Please make a choice! 
 
I opined that yes, the fat man should be tortured. 
The reaction to my answers to this quiz was as follows: 
Should You Kill the Fat Man? - Analysis 1 
A Matter of Consistency 
 
The first thing to note is that your consistency score is 100%. This is higher 
than the average score for this test (where higher is better), which is 78%. 
It is often thought to be a good thing if one’s moral choices are governed by a 
small number of consistently applied moral principles. If this is not the case, then 
there is the worry that moral choices are essentially arbitrary - just a matter of 
intuition or making it up as you go along. Suppose, for example, you think it is 
justified to divert the train in the first scenario simply because it is the best way 
to maximise human happiness, but you do not think this justification applies in 
the case of the fat man on the bridge. The problem here is that unless you’re able 
to identify morally relevant differences between the two scenarios, then it isn’t 
clear what role the justification plays in the first case. Put simply, it seems that 
the justification is neither necessary nor sufficient for the moral judgement that it 
is right to divert the train. 
You’ve done better than average in this test, but now is not the time to rest on 
your laurels, because let’s face it, most people don’t think very clearly about 
morality. However, before you embark on any further study(!) we suggest you 
check out the next page of analysis. 
My reaction. Whoa, I am not sure that I like this even one tiny bit. If a non 
libertarian thinks I am logically consistent, perhaps I have erred somewhere along 
the line, for, as I say, there is a gigantic chasm between the thinking of those who 
favor, and oppose, the freedom philosophy. 
 
The next response of the quizmaster is this: 
The Trolley Problem  - Analysis 2  
The scenarios featured in this activity have been constructed to elicit 
contrasting intuitions about whether it is justified to end the life of one person in 
order to save the lives of some other greater number of people. 
Part of what is interesting here is what this tell us about consequentialist 
approaches to moral thinking. For example, straightforward utilitarianism, which 
holds that an act is morally right to the extent that it maximises the sum total of 
happiness of all the people affected by it (when compared to the other available 
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options), would seem to require an affirmative response to all the questions below. 
However, we know from previous research that such a consensus is unlikely. In 
particular, very few people tend to think that the fat man should be pushed off 
the bridge in order to save the lives of the five people stuck on the track. The fact 
that this option is so counterintuitive to so many people represents a significant 
challenge to straightforward utilitarian thinking. 
I am not sure of what to make of all of this, but I report it, just to be 
thorough. 
I opted to torture this fat pig of a man. This seems like a no brainer to me. 
Such an ogre deserves the most heinous punishment imaginable, and torture 
would appear to fit the bill. I resist the notion, however, that there is any 
“tension” in my answers. Yes, this is a reasonable position for a non-libertarian to 
take of an adherent of this position, but this is a two way street. I, too, see a 
“tension” in the mainstream view, not to say an utter contradiction, with the 
NAP. 
The point of this exercise is not to cast aspersions on the quiz. It is well 
thought out, and interesting. Rather, my goal here is to establish that there is 
rather a large chasm between the thinking of non libertarian philosophers, who, I 
assume, concocted this quiz, and libertarians such as myself, who fit into this 
model as do round pegs into square holes or vice versa. 
When asked about morality, I chose to call the heroic murderer “moral.” I 
could have easily gone the other way around, since I have no strong views on 
ethics or morals. (I only have an established perspective on what the law should 
be: to punish murderers, heroic or not, unless forgiven for their crimes). If I had 
indicated this, I suspect, my opinion would not have been characterized as 100% 
consistent by the non-libertarian creator of this quiz. 
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